Emory Law Journal
Volume 61
Issue 4 The 2011 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium — Judging Politics: Judges as Political
Actors, Candidates, and Arbiters of the Political
2012

Reintroducing Intent into Predatory Pricing Law
Dustin Sharpes

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj

Recommended Citation
Dustin Sharpes, Reintroducing Intent into Predatory Pricing Law, 61 Emory L. J. 903 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol61/iss4/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

SHARPES GALLEYS4

7/5/2012 2:12 PM

REINTRODUCING INTENT INTO PREDATORY
PRICING LAW
ABSTRACT
Predatory pricing occupies a strange position in the antitrust laws.
Normally, low prices are one of the major goals of antitrust law because they
reflect competition and are generally beneficial to consumers. However, in
some situations, the antitrust laws condemn prices that are too low as
predatory: a company may be able to set prices arbitrarily low to gain
monopoly power by excluding rivals or forcing them to acquiesce to its price
leadership, and the company may then charge monopoly prices to the
detriment of consumers. Separating normal, competitive low prices from
predatory low prices is a difficult task, which, if not managed correctly, may
completely frustrate the purpose of the antitrust laws.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., courts used wide-ranging standards to distinguish
between competitive low prices and anticompetitive predatory prices. The
Court’s decision foreclosed some more holistic standards by mandating two
prerequisites for any predatory pricing claim: (1) below-cost pricing and (2)
feasibility of recoupment. Despite the fact that Brooke Group did not foreclose
other elements or considerations, courts have tended to treat its prerequisites
as dispositive. This Comment argues that such an interpretation has resulted in
an overly inclusive rule that is likely to become increasingly problematic given
recent scholarship advocating expansion of the scope of the current doctrine.
Current law is missing a key element that should be required for any predatory
pricing claim: predatory intent. This Comment argues that adding an intent
element to the current doctrine would be perfectly consistent with Brooke
Group and, more broadly, with policies underlying antitrust law. Properly
implemented, an intent requirement would add clarity to existing law by
producing a theoretically complete definition of predatory pricing and would
provide an important limiting principle on the scope of the law.

SHARPES GALLEYS4

904

7/5/2012 2:12 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:903

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 905
I. BACKGROUND: THE ROLE AND STATUS OF PREDATORY PRICING
LAW .................................................................................................... 907
A. The Role of Predatory Pricing in the Antitrust Laws ................. 908
B. Statutory Coverage ..................................................................... 910
C. Brooke Group and the Current Status of the Law ...................... 911
II. CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH PREDATORY PRICING AND RECENT
PROPOSALS ......................................................................................... 914
III. THE ROLE OF INTENT BEFORE AND AFTER BROOKE GROUP .............. 919
A. Intent Before Brooke Group ....................................................... 920
B. Intent After Brooke Group .......................................................... 928
IV. ADDING AN INTENT REQUIREMENT .................................................... 931
A. Meaning of Predatory Intent ...................................................... 932
1. Basic Meaning ...................................................................... 932
2. Evidentiary Issues ................................................................. 934
B. Why Intent? ................................................................................. 936
1. Statutory Requirements ........................................................ 936
2. Intent as a Limiting Principle ............................................... 940
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 942

SHARPES GALLEYS4

2012]

7/5/2012 2:12 PM

REINTRODUCING INTENT INTO PREDATORY PRICING LAW

905

INTRODUCTION
Small Town is home to four grocery stores and five gasoline filling
stations.1 Local Grocery, a regional subsidiary of National Grocery, operates
two of the grocery stores. Each of its two stores operates a gas station. Gas
Filling Services, a regional gasoline wholesaler, operates two of the town’s gas
stations. Ray’s Filling Station operates the remaining gas station. Ray’s is a
privately owned, local business that has been in operation for thirty-five years.
Several years ago, Local Grocery began a promotion it called the “Grocery
Discount Program.” Under the program, customers could earn discounts at its
gas stations based on the amount they spent at its grocery stores. For the first
few months of the program, customers who purchased $25–$49.99 in groceries
earned $0.04 per gallon off the posted price of gas, and customers who
purchased $50 or more earned an $0.08-per-gallon discount. After the first few
months, Local Grocery changed the terms so that a purchase of $35 or more
earned a $0.15-per-gallon discount. Ten months later it deepened the discounts
again: a purchase of $50 or more earned a $0.20-per-gallon discount. The
program was wildly popular among Local Grocery’s customers.
However, the program was not popular with Gas Filling Services and Ray’s
Filling Station. They could not keep pace with Local Grocery’s low gas prices,
and they lost a significant amount of money as a result. After thirty-six years of
operation, Ray’s Filling Station was forced to shut down. Gas Filling Services
and Ray’s Filling Station take issue not only with the effect of Local Grocery’s
discount program on their profit margins but also with its legality. They file an
antitrust lawsuit against Local Grocery, alleging that it attempted to
monopolize the local gas filling business through a scheme of predatory
pricing. If Gas Filling Services and Ray’s Filling Station prevail, they are
entitled to treble damages.2
Small Town’s story illustrates the central difficulty in predatory pricing
law. Normally, antitrust laws are aimed at encouraging low prices because they

1 This fact pattern is based on Parish Oil Co. v. Dillon Cos., 523 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2008). Note that
this case was brought under Colorado’s Unfair Practices Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-2-101 to -117 (2011),
rather than under federal antitrust laws. Parish Oil Co., 523 F.3d at 1247. This Comment deals only with
federal antitrust laws. The issues, however, are essentially the same.
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
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reflect competitive markets and benefit consumers.3 However, predatory
pricing doctrine recognizes that, in some situations, low prices are harmful to
competition and to consumers. Companies may artificially lower prices to
achieve monopoly power and thereafter charge supracompetitive prices to the
detriment of the public.4 The problem arises in attempting to separate
competitive low prices from anticompetitive low prices that are likely to lead
to a monopoly. From the information available, the Small Town scenario
seems consistent with each.5
But how do we go about separating competitive low prices, which are the
very goal of the antitrust laws, from anticompetitive predatory prices, which
the antitrust laws forbid? It would seem logical to begin with a clear definition
of what constitutes predatory pricing and then to develop rules for determining
when prices fit that definition. However, this is not how the law has developed.
Courts and commentators have instead worked backwards, developing various
tools for identifying when low prices have anticompetitive effects without first
agreeing on any one definition of a predatory pricing scheme.6 As a result,
courts have used fairly wide-ranging standards for assessing predatory pricing
claims.7 The Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. foreclosed some of these standards by making clear
that a predatory pricing claim must satisfy two prerequisites: (1) prices were
below some measure of cost (though it declined to specify the appropriate
measure), and (2) it was feasible that the alleged predator could recoup the
initial losses it sustained by pricing below cost.8 The second prerequisite is
important because, if it is not met, a predatory scheme would not be profitable.
Because of the flexibility of the Brooke Group prerequisites, the decision

3

See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
PRACTICE 3–7 (3d ed. 2005) (explaining why, as a matter of basic economic theory, competitive markets
are a chief goal of antitrust law).
4 See 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 723a, at 22 (3d ed. 2008).
5 The fact that Local Grocery’s discount program ran Ray’s Filling Station out of business is not
particularly relevant. The antitrust laws are aimed at protecting “competition, not competitors.” Brooke Grp.
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis omitted)). In other words, harming competitors through low prices
is perfectly compatible with normal competition.
6 See infra Part I.C.
7 See generally MARGARET C. LING ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, PREDATORY PRICING LAW: A CIRCUIT-BYCIRCUIT SURVEY 20–70 (Barbara O. Bruckman ed., 1995) (explaining the standards utilized by each of the
federal circuits).
8 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222–24.
ITS
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really only foreclosed more holistic standards9 and did not mandate that its two
prerequisites were to be the only elements of a predatory pricing claim.
However, since Brooke Group, the overwhelming tendency of courts has been
to hold that these prerequisites are necessary and sufficient to establish the
existence of predatory pricing.10
This Comment argues that this interpretation is misguided. This Comment
argues that courts should add a third requirement—predatory intent—and that
doing so would be perfectly consistent with Brooke Group. The Comment
proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a background on the role of predatory
pricing in the antitrust laws and describes the current status of the law. Part II
identifies problems with the current law and predatory pricing doctrine
generally. It also briefly discusses several other proposals for reforming the
law and considers how these proposals may contribute to the problem in the
future. Part III identifies intent as the element lacking in current analyses and
discusses the role of intent in the law before and after Brooke Group. Finally,
Part IV argues that intent should be explicitly required as an element of any
predatory pricing claim. This final part clarifies the concept of intent and
argues that requiring this element would be more faithful to antitrust law and
policy, and would provide an important limiting principle on the scope of the
law.
I. BACKGROUND: THE ROLE AND STATUS OF PREDATORY PRICING LAW
Since their inception, the antitrust laws have condemned the practice of
predatory pricing.11 While predatory pricing’s illegality has long been a part of
the American legal tradition, there has been, and remains, much confusion
about the legal and practical limits of the formal predatory pricing doctrine.12
Then-Professor Easterbrook once suggested that “we have so many theories [of

9 See, e.g., McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1502 (11th Cir. 1988) (explaining a
standard under which predatory intent is determinative and the relation between price and cost merely allocates
the burden).
10 See infra Part III.B.
11 LING ET AL., supra note 7, at 9–10 (stating the difficulty early cases had in defining predatory pricing).
12 See id. at 1 (discussing the difficulty of defining the doctrine); Daniel A. Crane, The Perverse Effects
of Predatory Pricing Law, REG., Winter 2005–2006, at 26, 26 (“In the early years . . . courts frequently used
conclusory epithets . . . to condemn price-cutting by dominant firms without undertaking any meaningful
inquiry . . . .”); Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284,
284 (1977) (“Until recently predatory pricing has been a relatively vague concept in antitrust law. This may be
because emotive terms, such as predatory pricing, do not invite and sometimes defy analysis.” (footnote
omitted)).
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predatory pricing] for the same reason that 600 years ago there were a
thousand positions on what dragons looked like.”13 While such a suggestion is
hyperbole, it does illustrate the elusiveness of the concept. This Part introduces
that concept: section A discusses its role within the antitrust laws, section B
discusses the applicable statutes, and section C provides a summary of the
current framework for analyzing predatory pricing claims.
A. The Role of Predatory Pricing in the Antitrust Laws
The general idea of predatory pricing is that a company may monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, a market by setting its prices artificially low. By
charging otherwise-unreasonably-low, nonremunerative prices, a company
may exclude rivals or coerce them into following its prices, rather than
continuing legitimate price competition.14 After a company gains monopoly
power through this pricing strategy, it recoups the losses it incurred from the
low prices by charging supracompetitive prices and realizing monopoly
profits.15 The antitrust laws target this behavior because of its anticompetitive
effects.16
The difficulty with predatory pricing doctrine is that, in many ways, it
seems to be at odds with the objectives of antitrust law: ensuring vigorous
competition and low prices for consumers.17 Aggressive price reductions—
even those that eliminate competitors—are generally thought to be procompetitive and thus beneficial to consumers.18 Predatory pricing obscures this
notion and often seems to confuse the preservation of competitors with the
preservation of competition.19 This obfuscation of antitrust policy has led one
13

Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 264

(1981).
14

AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 723a, at 22.
Id.
16 Id.; see also A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1399 (7th Cir. 1989)
(“[T]he gravamen [of predatory pricing] is that the aggressor sold goods for too little money, hoping to cripple
or discipline rivals so that it might sell its wares for a monopoly price later, recouping the losses and adding a
hefty profit, to the detriment of consumers.”); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for
Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 220–21 (1979) (“The primary objective of antitrust
policy is to promote full and fair market competition and to reap the benefits that competition brings with it.
Stated in negative terms, the goal is to discourage monopoly, monopolization, and associated monopoly
behavior and the inefficiencies they generate.” (footnote omitted)).
17 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 723a, at 22; ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50–51 (1978); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 50–51 (3d ed. 2005).
18 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223–24 (1993).
19 See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 16, at 221.
15
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commentator to conclude that “[p]redatory pricing is a paradoxical offense.”20
Determining the proper reach of the doctrine so as to square it with the rest of
antitrust law is essentially the problem that has plagued courts and
commentators.
Some scholars—notably those belonging to the Chicago School—have
argued for the outright rejection of the doctrine, suggesting that predatory
pricing strategies are irrational and virtually nonexistent.21 In their views, such
a strategy is unlikely to be profitable for a number of reasons. For a firm to
employ a strategy of predation, it would have to incur substantial losses by
selling below cost for a potentially significant period of time.22 Losses would
be compounded by the fact that, by cutting prices, the firm would
simultaneously be expanding output.23 Furthermore, the firm’s entire plan
would hinge on its ability to recoup these losses by charging supracompetitive
prices for some duration thereafter, which would be difficult because (1)
consumers might thwart its efforts by stockpiling in the low-price period, (2)
new entry into the monopolized market would be relatively easy unless barriers
to entry were high, and (3) the amount recouped would have to be great
enough to offset the loss of the time value of its predatory investment and the
uncertainty that its strategy would be effective.24 Given the difficulties inherent
in employing a strategy of predatory pricing, this group of scholars concluded
that such a strategy is very unlikely to be employed, and because it is very
difficult to distinguish predatory strategies from ordinary competition, it is not
worth attempting to police the practice: recognizing predatory pricing claims
would be more likely to protect competitors than to protect competition.25
Other scholars argued that, despite the potential difficulties the doctrine
presents, the anticompetitive effect of the practice brings it within the proper
scope of the antitrust laws.26 Rather than dispensing with the doctrine, these
scholars sought to establish rules that would enable courts to distinguish

20

Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).
E.g., John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137,
142–43 (1958); see also Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective,
62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 586–89 (1994).
22 See BORK, supra note 17, at 148–49; Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 268, 275; McGee, supra note 21, at
139.
23 See BORK, supra note 17, at 149; Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 268.
24 BORK, supra note 17, at 149–52; Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 269–75.
25 BORK, supra note 17, at 154–55; Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 333–37.
26 See, e.g., Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697 (1975).
21
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between predatory strategies and ordinary competition.27 More recently, some
commentators have perceived that predatory pricing, far from being a rarity, is
actually quite prevalent and have devised broader standards to combat it.28 In
sum, scholarship relating to the proper scope of predatory pricing law is all
over the map. However, the mainstream view is that predatory pricing is rare
but that antitrust law does have a role in policing it.29
B. Statutory Coverage
The primary statutory provisions applicable to predatory pricing claims are
section 2 of the Sherman Act30 and the Robinson–Patman Act.31 Section 2 of
the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations.”32 “[T]o demonstrate attempted monopolization a
plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or
anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.”33

27 See id. at 699–700 (“[W]e will attempt to formulate meaningful and workable tests for distinguishing
between predatory and competitive pricing by examining the relationship between a firm’s costs and its
prices.”); Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 16, at 223 (“[T]he best way to assess whether current behavior is
predatory is to evaluate its expected effects on long-run market outcomes.”); F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing
and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869, 890 (1976) (summarizing proposed deviations from
simple, cost-based rules); Williamson, supra note 12, at 306–15 (discussing the optimality of various potential
rules).
28 E.g., Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239,
2262–74 (2000); Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941, 941–43 (2002).
29 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226–27 (1993); AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 723a, at 22–23.
30 Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
31 Robinson–Patman Antidiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)). These are not the only statutes under which predatory pricing claims might
arise. For example, claims may also arise under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, e.g., E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 655 (1980) (considering litigation pursuant to section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 45)), or under state unfair competition laws, e.g., Parish Oil Co. v. Dillon Cos., 523 F.3d 1244, 1247 (10th
Cir. 2008) (considering litigation pursuant to Colorado’s Unfair Practices Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-2-101
to -117 (2011)).
32 15 U.S.C. § 2. Predatory pricing claims are most frequently brought as attempted monopolization
cases, rather than as completed monopolization cases. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 724a, at
36. For this reason, this Comment deals only with the former.
33 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
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The Robinson–Patman Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit
34
of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.

Price discrimination does not have much meaning: it simply means a “price
difference.”35 However, the Act does not prohibit all price differences—only
those that threaten to injure competition or create a monopoly.36 Under the Act,
there are two types of violations: primary-line violations and secondary-line
violations. “Primary line violations are directed at injuring competition with
the discriminating seller’s direct competitors, whereas secondary line
violations are directed at injuring competition among the discriminating
seller’s customers.”37 Though the vagueness of the respective statutes could
lead to different applications of each, predatory pricing is essentially the same
under either statute: a business has set unreasonably low prices to gain
monopoly power by excluding or coercing rivals.38 The statutes, ultimately,
provide little clarification.39
C. Brooke Group and the Current Status of the Law
With little statutory guidance, predatory pricing law has been mostly judgemade and heavily influenced by academic proposals. A persisting problem
with the development of the law is that courts and commentators have had
difficulty even agreeing on a definition of predatory pricing.40 Rather than
developing standards from a unified definition, courts have, over time,
developed various tools for distinguishing between competitive and

34

15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993) (quoting Texaco
Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 558 (1990)).
36 See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
37 Able Sales Co. v. Compañía de Azúcar de P.R., 406 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2005).
38 See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222; A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396,
1399 (7th Cir. 1989).
39 The statutes, however, are somewhat useful in determining the proper limits of the doctrine even if
they do not clarify exactly what the offense is. See infra Part IV.
40 See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 16, at 219.
35
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anticompetitive prices.41 Three major tools developed: (1) analyzing the
alleged predator’s price–cost relationship, (2) examining the market to
determine whether recoupment was feasible, and (3) focusing on the alleged
predator’s intent. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., courts employed wide-ranging
standards that utilized some combination of these tools.42
Most courts focused on whether the defendant’s prices were below its
costs; however, there were a number of measures of costs that courts used.43 In
a seminal article, Professors Areeda and Turner argued that the theoretically
correct measure was marginal cost; prices below this measure, they argued,
were economically irrational unless the firm was employing a predatory
strategy.44 Because of the difficulties of measuring marginal cost, they
proposed using average variable cost (AVC) as a proxy.45 However, other
scholars criticized the Areeda–Turner rule on a number of grounds.46 As a
result, the Areeda–Turner rule was influential but not uniformly embraced;
instead, courts utilized a number of different measures of cost.47 In addition to
the price–cost relationship, the recoupment inquiry gained traction as a
relatively easy-to-employ filtering mechanism.48 And some courts utilized

41 See Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d at 1400–01 (reviewing various approaches developed by courts to
distinguish between competitive and anticompetitive prices).
42 See infra Part III.
43 See Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d at 1400. See generally MARGARET C. LING ET AL., supra note 7, at 25–
70 (discussing the measures of cost used in each circuit).
44 Areeda & Turner, supra note 26, at 712–13. Marginal cost is the incremental cost of each additional
unit of output; it is purely a function of variable costs. Id. at 700.
45 Id. at 716–17. AVC, as the name suggests, is “the sum of all variable costs divided by output.” Id. at
700.
46 See, e.g., William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of
Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1, 2–4 (1979) (criticizing the “static analysis” of the Areeda–Turner rule for
overlooking the “intertemporal” nature of predatory pricing); Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 16, at 222
(“[T]o dismiss entirely an assessment of long-run effects, as for example Areeda and Turner seem to do, is to
dismiss the essence of the predatory pricing problem.” (footnote omitted)); Scherer, supra note 27, at 869
(“[Areeda and Turner’s] analysis of what it means to set a price below marginal cost is imprecise and
incompletely developed. . . . [It] leaves out important variables . . . .”); Williamson, supra note 12, at 285–86
(“[The Areeda–Turner] marginal cost pricing rules . . . may not yield the immediate social welfare gains that
Areeda and Turner attribute to them and, more importantly, . . . make no allowance for strategic behavior by
dominant firms.”).
47 See generally MARGARET C. LING ET AL., supra note 7, at 25–70 (discussing the standards utilized in
each circuit).
48 See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Ind. Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir.
1989); Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 16 at 222–23.
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more holistic standards that used considerations such as intent as the ultimate
touchstone for identifying predation.49
Brooke Group settled some—and failed to settle other—disputes. It made
clear that, whether a claim arises under the Sherman Act or the Robinson–
Patman Act, the law is essentially the same. Furthermore, it set out two
prerequisites to recovery in any predatory pricing claim. Under Brooke Group,
a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) set prices “below an appropriate
measure of its . . . costs”50 and (2) had a “reasonable prospect” (under section
2(a) of the Robinson–Patman Act), or “a dangerous probability” (under section
2 of the Sherman Act), “of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”51
The Court affirmed the court of appeals decision—upholding the judgment
notwithstanding the verdict—because the plaintiff, Liggett, failed to establish
that Brown & Williamson had a reasonable prospect of recouping its predatory
investment.52 The Court therefore emphasized to lower courts its earlier stated
view that “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely
successful.”53 Its analysis suggested to courts that the bar in predatory pricing
claims should be high;54 courts should be skeptical of predatory pricing claims
and should scrutinize the feasibility of recoupment. However, the Court
expressly declined to settle the split among the lower courts as to the
appropriate measure of cost to consider.55 Furthermore, the Court only
established pricing below cost and feasibility of recoupment as prerequisites,
leaving open the status of other considerations.56
Following Brooke Group, the overwhelming tendency of courts has been to
hold that plaintiffs fail to satisfy the two prerequisites.57 As a result, the
49

See infra Part III for a more detailed discussion of the role of intent.
Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993).
51 Id. at 224.
52 Id. at 231–32.
53 Id. at 226 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589).
54 See id. (“These prerequisites . . . are not easy to establish, but they are not artificial obstacles to
recovery . . . .”).
55 See id. at 222 n.1 (“Because the parties in this case agree that the relevant measure of cost is average
variable cost . . . we again decline to resolve the conflict among the lower courts over the appropriate measure
of cost.”). The circuits remain split as to what the appropriate measure of cost is to satisfy the first prong of the
Brooke Group standard. Some follow the Areeda–Turner approach of using marginal cost (or average variable
cost as a proxy), while others use average total cost or some other measure. Compare, e.g., Int’l Air Indus.,
Inc. v. Am. Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975) (using a short-run profit-maximizing test), with Spirit
Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005) (using average variable cost).
56 See infra Part III for a discussion of the role of intent in predatory pricing claims after Brooke Group.
57 See Crane, supra note 20, at 4 (“[A]lthough it is accepted wisdom that no predatory pricing plaintiff
has won a verdict since Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., plaintiffs have recently
50
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Court’s standard has come under attack as being overly harsh and nearly
impossible to satisfy.58 This Comment maintains that the Brooke Group
standard does not set an artificially high bar for predatory pricing claims and is
not overly harsh to plaintiffs. Quite the contrary: the Brooke Group standard is
not exacting enough. The current standard sets out requirements that are—and
should be—necessary for a predatory pricing claim but should not be
sufficient. The current standard is therefore overly broad and risks condemning
behavior that poses none of the risks of true predatory pricing.
II. CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH PREDATORY PRICING AND RECENT PROPOSALS
Recent commentary has focused on the fact that, since the Supreme Court’s
decision in Brooke Group, no plaintiff has ultimately succeeded in a claim of
predatory pricing in the federal courts.59 As a result, it might be argued that
any debate over predatory pricing law is now purely academic. However, there
are several reasons to believe that the contours of predatory pricing law
continue to have practical significance and pose substantial concerns.
Conclusory statements that no plaintiff has prevailed since Brooke Group
are somewhat misleading. Plaintiffs have won some cases in court and have
obtained significant settlements in others.60 Furthermore, despite their low
won some predatory pricing cases and procured substantial settlements in others.” (footnotes omitted)); Edlin,
supra note 28, at 941 (“Since 1993, when the Supreme Court decided Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., no predatory pricing plaintiff has prevailed in a final determination in the federal
courts.” (footnote omitted)).
58 See, e.g., Bolton et al., supra note 28, at 2241; Edlin, supra note 28, at 941–43.
59 Edlin, supra note 28, at 941; Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique,
2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 312; Kimberly L. Herb, Note, The Predatory Pricing Puzzle: Piecing
Together a Unitary Standard, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1571, 1574 (2007). There are at least a couple of
reasons to believe that this does not indicate an overly rigid doctrine. First, plaintiffs’ lack of success may
reflect judges’ skepticism about predatory pricing claims more than a strict legal standard. Second, because of
the potentially ruinous size of verdicts in such cases, parties faced with an adverse judgment have a strong
incentive to settle. Indeed, a good many have. See Crane, supra note 20, at 16 (explaining the inducement to
settle, noting that “many predatory pricing lawsuits are so-called bet-the-company events”).
60 See LePage’s Inc. v. 3M (Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co.), 324 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(noting a $22.8 million jury verdict, trebled to $68.5 million plus interest, in the trial court); Kinetic Concepts,
Inc. v. Hillenbrand Indus., 262 F. Supp. 2d 722, 725–26 (W.D. Tex. 2003) (noting a $173.6 million jury
verdict that would have been trebled to $520.8 million, but the case was dismissed upon settlement);
Brunswick to Settle Pricing Suits for $65 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1999, at C4 (noting a company’s
agreement to pay $65 million to settle predatory pricing lawsuits); Harlan S. Byrne, In a Real Fix, BARRON’S,
Oct. 2, 1995, at 16, 16 (reporting that, after a trial court awarded Thermex Energy $488 million in a suit
against ICI Explosives and Dyno Industries, ICI settled for $36 million and Dyno settled for an undisclosed
amount); Vicki Vaughan, Family Feud—Centeno Heirs Battle to Control Ruins of Bankrupt Grocery Chain,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 2, 1996, at J1 (reporting a $6.5 million settlement between two grocery
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success rate, a large number of claims have been filed since the decision.61
This fact is significant for two reasons. First, the filings themselves make
debate about the proper boundaries of predatory pricing law significant
because the potential awards are so great—perhaps in the hundreds of millions
of dollars, if not greater.62 Awards are prone to being especially large because
of treble damages and the fact that plaintiffs are automatically entitled to
receive attorney’s fees.63 With such large potential verdicts, the risk of an
erroneous judgment is great.64 Second, the fact that plaintiffs continue to file
predatory pricing claims with little hope of prevailing suggests that plaintiffs
are making these claims for other reasons.
One commentator suggests that plaintiffs can “win without winning”65 by
“strategically misus[ing] predatory pricing law”66 either to force a defendantcompetitor to raise its prices or to implement a scheme of tacit collusion.67 For
example, a less efficient plaintiff might threaten or bring a predatory pricing
case against its more efficient competitor, using the threat of expensive
litigation and a potential adverse judgment to cause its competitor to cease a
course of price competition.68 If the threat does not work, the expenses of
litigation may raise the defendant’s costs to the extent that it is forced to raise
its prices anyway.69 Such a strategy could likely be employed successfully
even though the plaintiff’s likelihood of success in court is low—and is even
stores); Mark L. Kovner—Partner, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?
contentID=220&itemID=7912 (last visited July 5, 2012) (reporting a “very favorable settlement” for BeechNut Nutrition Corporation in a predatory pricing suit against Gerber Products Company following a Ninth
Circuit opinion in Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp. v. Gerber Products Co., 69 F. App’x 350 (9th Cir. 2003)).
61 Crane, supra note 20, at 6–8. At least fifty-seven claims had been filed as of 2005, and Crane estimates
that the true number could be in the hundreds. Id. at 8 n.19.
62 See supra note 60; see also Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
218 (1993) (reversing a $49.6 million jury verdict, which trebled to $148.8 million); MCI Commc’ns Corp. v.
AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1160 (7th Cir. 1983) (reversing a $1.8 billion judgment, which was based on a
number of antitrust claims, including predatory pricing).
63 See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
64 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 723b, at 24.
65 Crane, supra note 12, at 27.
66 Crane, supra note 20, at 6.
67 Id. at 5, 16–17.
68 Id. at 9. If the threat is credible, a firm might quite reasonably conclude that raising its prices would be
less costly than engaging in litigation. Id. For the threat to be credible, the potential defendant has to believe
that the case would be more costly to it than to the potential plaintiff. Id. at 10–11. It may believe this for
several reasons: (1) loss aversion (or tendency to weigh losses more heavily than gains), (2) potential
reputational harm from an antitrust lawsuit that may have adverse market effects, (3) potential for plaintiffs to
hire lawyers on contingency (in contrast to the defendants), and (4) inherent asymmetry in the costs of antitrust
litigation. Id. at 10–13.
69 See id. at 12.
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perceived as such. The defendant firm must only perceive the expected cost of
the litigation and a potential adverse judgment as less costly than relenting on
price70—not too tall an order given the high litigation costs and the large size
of potential judgments.71
Additionally, a plaintiff may use a predatory pricing claim to set the stage
for a scheme of tacit collusion. In a normal market, coordination of prices
among competitors is thwarted by uncertainty over each other’s competitive
data and the incentive to—or suspicion that others will—cheat (i.e.,
unilaterally vary from a coordinated price).72 Predatory pricing litigation
removes many of the impediments to the successful implementation of such a
scheme. A complaint itself may serve as a legal means of price signaling “by
providing a detailed specification of the plaintiff’s objections to the
defendant’s present pricing structure,”73 and discovery facilitates the detailed
exchange of revenue, cost, and other competitive data, removing uncertainty
about competitors’ present and future pricing strategies and capabilities.74
Finally, the courts themselves provide a policing mechanism by monitoring the
defendants’ pricing behaviors and sometimes enjoining them, at least pending
resolution of the dispute, from lowering prices below a certain rate.75 Thus,
there is a very real possibility that plaintiffs sometimes file illegitimate
predatory pricing claims to achieve supracompetitive pricing schemes
antithetical to antitrust law, and that the laxity of the law contributes to the
success of such strategies.
There is also substantial risk of David-versus-Goliath-type rhetoric being
employed to punish firms simply for being large.76 For various reasons
completely unrelated to predatory pricing—including economies of scale,

70

Id.; Crane, supra note 12, at 27–28.
See supra notes 60, 62.
72 See generally THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS
ORIGINS 64–65 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing the problems faced by cartels in implementing schemes of price
collusion).
73 Crane, supra note 20, at 17.
74 Id. at 17–19.
75 Id. at 19–20; see also Am. Bldg. Prods., L.L.C. v. Ashley Aluminum, Inc., No. CIV.A. 97-2976, 1997
WL 610877, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 1, 1997) (granting a temporary restraining order prohibiting an aggressor
company from lowering prices while the case proceeded); Advantage Publ’ns, Inc. v. Daily Press, Inc., No. 8372-NN, 1983 WL 1829, at *9 (E.D. Va. May 23, 1983) (setting conditions of conducting business for the
defendant company in a predatory pricing suit).
76 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 723a, at 22–23 (noting “exaggerated fears” that large
companies engage in predatory pricing); BORK, supra note 17, at 4–7 (discussing the influence of “populist
hostility to big business” on antitrust law and its enforcement).
71
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vertical integration, and synergies unavailable to smaller companies—large
companies can often produce products at much lower prices than smaller
companies.77 At trial, fact finders are unlikely to take these factors into account
and may be inclined to hold large-company defendants liable based on their
size.78 This danger is particularly acute if the law is overly generous to
plaintiffs.79 A study of jurors in several antitrust trials—including Brooke
Group—is telling. Interviews of these jurors revealed that they were
completely confused by the underlying law and testimony and that they lacked
even a basic grasp of the relevant concepts.80 From these interviews, the study
concluded that the jury verdict in Brooke Group in particular was based largely
on factors other than legal or factual justifications, including the populist
sentiments of some of the jurors.81
While a number of suggestions have been made for alleviating some of the
current problems with predatory pricing—limiting or eliminating competitor
standing, eliminating the remedy of treble damages, implementing a scheme of
fee shifting (specifically a loser-pays system), and bifurcating the discovery
process82—they offer incomplete solutions. Furthermore, recent commentary
seems likely to expand the scope of the current law. It has emphasized that
more modern economic theory and more recent empirical studies—relying on
more sophisticated techniques—suggest that predatory pricing is much more
prevalent than previously thought.83 They have therefore proposed various
77

See MORGAN, supra note 72, at 17–18.
Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media, and Deviancy, 73 DENV. U.
L. REV. 51, 55–56 (1995).
79 See BORK, supra note 17, at 5 (“Unless the theory of antitrust is understood and the law brought into
line with it, the law will surely move on again, becoming even more unnecessarily restrictive of business
freedom.”); Crane, supra note 20, at 46–47 (noting the importance of courts in preventing the potential bias of
juries against large corporations from effecting false positives in predatory pricing claims).
80 Austin, supra note 78, at 52–59.
81 Id. at 55–57. For an earlier study of the outcomes of predatory pricing cases, see Roland H. Koller II,
The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., Summer 1971, at 105. The
study concluded that, out of twenty-three cases studied in which the defendant was found to have engaged in
predatory pricing, the defendant had only attempted a predatory pricing strategy in seven and was successful in
even fewer. Id. at 112.
82 See Crane, supra note 20, at 59–64; Crane, supra note 12, at 28–31. For a general discussion of the
appropriateness of competitor standing in predatory pricing cases, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4,
¶ 723e, at 33–35. Note that, if courts begin to recognize new, strategic theories of predation, limiting
competitor standing may be particularly appropriate because such theories assume imperfect information. It
would be somewhat contradictory to place no limits on claims that rivals priced below cost when the theory of
predation underlying the claim assumes that they lack knowledge of their rivals’ true costs.
83 See Malcolm R. Burns, New Evidence on Predatory Price Cutting, 10 MANAGERIAL & DECISION
ECON. 327 (1989) (stating that business letters discovered in the trial records of United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), econometric evidence of the Tobacco trust’s behavior, and game78
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standards for broadening the current scope of the law to deter predatory
schemes. Some have proposed essentially scrapping the current law to allow
predatory pricing to encompass even above-cost price cuts where they may
result in limited competition and fewer choices for consumers.84 Other
proposals have been less radical, working more within the Brooke Group
framework. For example, one proposal advocates applying a practical test to
the below-cost inquiry that would rely on the defendant’s own financial data to
reconstruct its calculations of its costs instead of relying on various theoretical
measures of cost.85 Another proposal suggests recognizing several new
theories as plausible predatory strategies, including financial-market predation
and predation based on several signaling theories.86 Under financial-market
predation, a firm may lower prices to an otherwise-rational level to harm
competitors’ profits and make lending to them risky—or at least appear to
be—to frighten away investors, thereby excluding rivals and deterring entry.87
Various signaling theories of predation would recognize that firms are
sometimes able to use price cuts to send messages to rivals or potential rivals
that have the effect of excluding them or deterring entry.88 At the same time, it
would recognize a more robust and clearly defined business-justification
defense “as a necessary shield against an overly inclusive legal rule.”89 So
while recent proposals have not been one-sided, they have reflected a belief
that predatory pricing is more prevalent than it was previously thought to be
and have advocated greatly expanding the current scope of the law.
Recent scholarship is likely to influence the courts; in fact, it may already
be doing so. For example, in United States v. AMR Corp., the Tenth Circuit

theoretical models of oligopoly demonstrate the rationality and plausibility of predatory strategies); David
Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Predation and Its Rate of Return: The Sugar Industry, 1887–1914, 37 RAND
J. ECON. 47, 47–48 (2006); Fiona Scott Morton, Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929, 6
J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 679, 680–81 (1997) (arguing that an empirical analysis of British shipping
companies’ behaviors around the turn of the nineteenth century suggests the prevalence of predatory
strategies); Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of
Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655, 699–708 (1982).
84 See, e.g., Edlin, supra note 28, at 945–47, 963 (proposing a rule that would require an incumbent
monopolist to freeze its prices following a significant new entry until the entrant is able to gain footing in the
market).
85 Herb, supra note 59, at 1604–05.
86 See Bolton et al., supra note 28, at 2248–49.
87 Id. at 2285–90.
88 Id. at 2299–312. For example, under test-market predation, a predator may cut prices when a
competitor attempts a limited entry to evaluate a potential market. By doing so, it can thwart the potential
competitor’s efforts and discourage entry. Id. at 2311–12.
89 Id. at 2274.
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stated that “[r]ecent scholarship has challenged the notion that predatory
pricing schemes are implausible and irrational” and that, because of these
developments, it would no longer approach claims of predatory pricing “with
the incredulity that once prevailed.”90 These shifting perceptions threaten to
make predatory pricing claims more prominent, which may increase the risk of
erroneous judgments for plaintiffs. They therefore necessitate a careful
consideration of the proper scope of the doctrine. The practice may be rare, and
there may be difficulties in separating it from ordinary competition; however,
there is evidence that such strategies are both plausible and actually utilized.91
Where present, such behavior hinders competition and leads to monopolistic
results: higher long-term prices, fewer choices for consumers, and reduced
incentive to innovate.
As the consistency of some of these recent proposals with the Brooke
Group standard suggests, the perceived rigidness of the current law is less a
matter of a strict standard than it is of judicial skepticism about the plausibility
of predatory pricing.92 Signs that judges are no longer as skeptical as they once
were and suggestions for expanding the scope of the current law may therefore
be problematic. This Comment argues that the current law is overly broad in
one key respect: its failure to consider predatory intent. The next Part discusses
the role intent has played in predatory pricing analysis before and after Brooke
Group, and Part IV proposes that intent be added as a third requirement to
provide a limitation on the current scope of the law.
III. THE ROLE OF INTENT BEFORE AND AFTER BROOKE GROUP
Prior to the Court’s decision in Brooke Group, the circuits were widely
split on the issue of the proper role of intent in predatory pricing analysis.
Section A summarizes the state of the law before the decision, focusing on four
important circuit court decisions split between two polar-opposite views.
Review of these cases reveals some of the major arguments on either side of
the intent debate as well as the general lack of clarity that existed on the
matter. Section B then discusses the effect Brooke Group had on the role of
intent, focusing on its legal and practical ramifications.
90

335 F.3d 1109, 1114–15 (10th Cir. 2003).
See supra note 83; see also Robert D. Joffe, Antitrust Law and Proof of Consumer Injury, 75 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 615, 625 (2001).
92 See Kenneth L. Glazer, Predatory Pricing and Beyond: Life After Brooke Group, 62 ANTITRUST L.J.
605, 626 (1994) (noting that Brooke Group allows courts to follow their own convictions about the presence of
predation).
91
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A. Intent Before Brooke Group
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group, there was a
substantial split of authority over the role of intent in predatory pricing law.
Scholars had divided on the issue for some time. Some argued for largely per
se rules that focused exclusively on economic analysis,93 while others argued
that consideration of intent was important to the complex analyses that were
required to properly implement the goals of antitrust enforcement.94 In the
years leading up to Brooke Group, several circuits considered the problem, and
two held intent to be an important component, while two essentially discarded
any consideration of intent in evaluating predatory pricing claims.95
Commentators aligned on both sides of the split.96
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in William Inglis & Sons Baking Co.
v. ITT Continental Baking Co.97 Plaintiff Inglis, a northern-California
wholesale bakery, claimed that Continental, a large, national wholesale baker,
engaged in predatory pricing in the market for private-label bread.98 The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant employed this scheme to obtain monopoly
power in the private-label-bread market, which it could leverage to reduce the
competitive disadvantage of its advertised-label bread.99 As a result of the

93

E.g., Areeda & Turner, supra note 26, at 697–98, 732–33.
E.g., Scherer, supra note 27, at 868–69, 890.
95 Compare William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1033–36 (9th
Cir. 1981) (requiring intent), and McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1504–05 (11th Cir. 1988)
(upholding the intent requirement), with Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir.
1983) (rejecting the intent requirement), and A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d
1396, 1402–03 (7th Cir. 1989) (same).
96 Compare, e.g., Steven R. Beck, Note, Intent as an Element of Predatory Pricing Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1242, 1242 (1991) (“A complete test for predatory pricing must
consider intent.”), with Michael C. Quinn, Note, Predatory Pricing Strategies: The Relevance of Intent Under
Antitrust, Unfair Competition, and Tort Law, 64 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 607, 628 (1990) (arguing that federal
antitrust law should not consider evidence of intent and that state unfair-competition and tort laws provide
alternatives for plaintiffs relying on this type of evidence).
97 668 F.2d 1014.
98 Id. at 1024.
99 Id. at 1024–25. Private-label bread is essentially generic-brand bread: it is produced by wholesale
bakers and marketed under a retailer’s label. Id. at 1024. Advertised-label bread is brand-name bread that is
generally available to all retailers. Id. A wholesaler’s private- and advertised-label breads are essentially the
same products, with the key difference being their respective prices. Id. Advertised-label bread commands a
higher price and thus a larger profit margin for the wholesaler. Id. Inglis essentially alleged that Continental
engaged in a predatory pricing scheme so that it could eliminate competition in the less profitable private-label
market so that it could raise prices in the market and cause retailers to purchase more advertised-label bread at
higher prices and profit margins. Id. at 1024–25.
94
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alleged scheme, Inglis incurred substantial losses in the private-label-bread
market and eventually ceased operations, bringing suit just prior to doing so.
At trial, Inglis presented both market- and intent-based evidence. With
respect to the market dynamics, Inglis showed that the defendant had cut its
prices per loaf over the alleged predatory period—first from $0.19 to $0.18,
and then to $0.172—and thereafter gradually increased prices, allegedly when
it realized Inglis was about to go out of business.100 Inglis showed that these
prices were below the defendant’s costs; it established that the defendant had
incurred substantial losses over this period and introduced expert testimony
that the defendant’s prices over this period were below its average variable
costs.101 Inglis’s intent-based evidence consisted of (1) an independent
consultant’s report identifying pricing “to hasten wholesaler exit” as one
possible means of combating private-label competition;102 (2) “reports by
Continental salesmen targeting Inglis private label accounts for enhanced
competitive efforts”;103 and (3) a memorandum written by the manager of one
of Continental’s regional bakeries in 1974, which opined that Inglis would
likely go out of business within the year.104 In response, Continental argued
that (1) the wholesale-bread market in northern California was extremely
competitive and that Continental itself lacked market power; (2) that the
innovation of “‘captive’ bakeries,” or in-store bakeries, increased competitive
pressure in the market during the relevant period; and (3) that federally
imposed price freezes accounted for its below-cost pricing and that the
termination of these freezes led to its subsequent price increases.105 The jury
returned a verdict for Inglis, but the district court granted defendant’s motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial.106
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial.107 It emphasized
that an attempt claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act requires three
elements—“(1) specific intent to control prices or destroy competition . . . ; (2)
predatory or anticompetitive conduct . . . ; and (3) a dangerous probability of
success”108—before settling on a primarily intent-based standard for predatory
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Id. at 1025.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1025 n.2.
Id. at 1025–26.
Id. at 1024.
Id.
Id. at 1027.
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pricing claims.109 The court held “that to establish predatory pricing a plaintiff
must prove that the anticipated benefits of defendant’s price depended on its
tendency to discipline or eliminate competition and thereby enhance the firm’s
long-term ability to reap the benefits of monopoly power.”110 This meant that
the ultimate standard was whether “the justification [for a firm’s prices was
based] . . . on their tendency to eliminate rivals and create a market structure
enabling the seller to recoup his losses.”111 The plaintiff would bear the burden
of showing the defendant’s prices were predatory if the defendant’s prices
were below average total cost but above average variable cost, while the
burden would shift to the defendant to justify its prices if the plaintiff showed
them to be below average variable cost.112 Thus, the court justified its rule by
tying it into the specific intent required for all section 2 attempt claims, a
requirement that developed by analogy to the law of criminal attempt and was
seen as necessary to confine the reach of the claim to conduct that threatened
monopolization.113 It further justified its intent-based standard as a way to
distinguish between anticompetitive predatory prices, which are the proper
subject of antitrust law, and ordinary, competitive ones that should not be
constrained.114 Nonetheless, the court did express some misgivings about
relying too heavily on evidence of intent. Specifically, it noted that direct
evidence of intent often does not correspond to whether there was indeed an
antitrust violation: savvy firms are careful not to leave evidence of any
improper intent, and statements that evince ordinary competitive desires may
be easily distorted.115 The court sought to avoid these pitfalls by requiring
corroborative conduct.116
However, the court found little evidence of predatory intent in the case at
hand. It dismissed the consultant’s report because, “[r]easonably interpreted, it
amount[ed] to no more than a recommendation of intensified price
competition,”117 and the mere suggestion of the idea in the consultant’s report

109
110
111

See id. at 1035–36.
Id. at 1035.
Id. The court identified only one nonpredatory justification for pricing below cost: cost minimization.

See id.
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id. at 1035–36.
See id. at 1027.
See id. at 1031 & n.18.
See id. at 1028 & n.6.
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1039.
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did not indicate that it was ever considered or adopted by Continental.118 Apart
from the consultant’s report, the court found little evidence of unlawful intent
and thus held that “[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a
new trial.”119
The Eleventh Circuit also maintained an intent requirement in McGahee v.
Northern Propane Gas Co.120 McGahee involved a claim of predation by a
new entrant into the Camilla, Georgia-area propane-gas market against an
established firm with a large market share.121 The plaintiff, McGahee, had
served as the defendant Northern’s district manager for some time but resigned
following a demotion.122 After leaving the company, he started his own
propane business in direct competition with the defendant and at least initially
was successful at acquiring a significant share of the market from the
defendant.123 The competition led to a price war during which, the plaintiff
claimed, the defendant had engaged in predatory pricing.124 The plaintiff
alleged that Northern sold propane at prices below average total cost and,
during some months, below average variable cost.125 He further presented
evidence that Northern sold propane at lower prices in Camilla than in other
areas and that part of its price reductions consisted of providing propane tanks
to customers rent free.126 Among the documents McGahee introduced was an
internal document in which Northern’s district manager referred to the plaintiff
as “Floyd The S.O.B.” and established “[c]ontribut[ing] to Floyd’s financial
problems” as a yearly goal.127 The district court was not persuaded and granted
summary judgment for Northern.128 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding
that “the test for predatory pricing must consider subjective evidence and
should use average total cost as the cost above which no inference of predatory
intent can be made.”129

118 Id. at 1038–39. The court specifically declined to rule on the admissibility of the report into evidence.
Id. at 1039 n.41.
119 Id. at 1039.
120 858 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1988).
121 Id. at 1491–92.
122 Id. at 1491.
123 Id. at 1492.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128 Id. at 1491.
129 Id. at 1496 (footnote omitted).
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In crafting its standard, the court disapproved of reliance on academic
commentary and instead focused on the antitrust statutes, their legislative
history, and recent Supreme Court precedent.130 It concluded that Congress
intended a defendant’s subjective intent to be an important consideration for
several reasons. First, the Sherman Act was a criminal statute codifying and
expanding the common law with proof of substantive violations requiring a
showing of specific intent.131 Second, the legislative background of public
outcry in 1890 against monopolies demonstrated “Congressional concern with
the economic and political power of large combinations and with restraining
harmful but not all competition.”132 Finally, discussions surrounding the
enactment of the Robinson–Patman Act indicated that Congress intended to
distinguish among different purposes for price cuts and differentials.133 The
court thus formulated an intent-based standard in which costs were a means of
implementing presumptions and allocating the burden of proof: prices above
average total cost could not be predatory, prices below short-run marginal cost
carried a rebuttable presumption of predatory intent, and prices between those
two measures created a permissible inference of predatory intent.134 Applying
this standard, the court found there to be a genuine issue of material fact and
reversed the district court’s decision.135 McGahee had presented evidence that
Northern’s prices were below average total cost along with several pieces of
evidence that—at least conjunctively—the court found could support a finding
of predatory intent. This evidence included Northern’s investigation of
McGahee’s financials, Northern’s new policy of rent-free tanks aimed at taking
advantage of McGahee’s financial position, and Northern’s internal
memorandum.136
The First Circuit addressed the issue in Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell
Corp.,137 becoming the first to reject an intent requirement. Pacific, the
defendant in Barry Wright, was a manufacturer of mechanical snubbers, or
shock absorbers used in the construction of nuclear-power-plant pipe

130 See id. at 1496–1502. The court specifically declined to embrace the Areeda–Turner test, which it
described as being “carved from economic assumptions, not from antitrust statutes and judicial precedents.” Id.
at 1495–96.
131 Id. at 1500.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 See id. at 1503–04.
135 Id. at 1504–05.
136 Id. at 1504.
137 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
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systems.138 Pacific was the only producer—domestic or foreign—of snubbers
that met the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s standards139 and, by virtue of
the lack of substitutes, had a 94% share of the domestic snubber market.140
Grinnell, a maker and installer of nuclear pipe systems, purchased a large share
of the mechanical snubbers sold in the United States.141 It entered into a
development contract with the plaintiff, Barry Wright, under which it hoped to
secure an alternative source of snubbers.142 Barry Wright’s production was
delayed, and Pacific, recognizing the potential competition, offered Grinnell
special discounts.143 Grinnell eventually discontinued its development contract
with Barry Wright, and the latter filed suit, alleging that Pacific’s discounts
amounted to predatory price cuts in violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act.144
The court rejected this claim, asserting a purely cost-based standard and
finding that the plaintiff failed to meet it.145 The court expressed general
disapproval of a subjective, intent-based approach, stating that it was too vague
of a standard and suggesting that it would result in a futile search for “smoking
gun” documents or statements.146 And, if direct evidence of intent were not
required (i.e., if intent could be inferred from a firm’s conduct and the
corresponding economic conditions), an application of Occam’s razor
suggested that the requirement of intent should simply be eliminated.147 It
therefore did so148 and found it unnecessary to delve into the intricacies of
various measures of cost in order to dismiss the claim, because the prices
involved exceeded both average and incremental costs and because “virtually
every court and commentator agree[d]” that such prices were lawful.149 It
concluded by expressly disapproving of the Ninth Circuit’s standard, which
“recognize[d] an economic circumstance in which even ‘above total cost’ price
cutting might . . . hurt the consumer.”150
138

Id. at 229.
Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 229–31.
145 See id. at 232–36.
146 Id. at 232.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 233 (quoting 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 711.1c, at 118 (Supp.
1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
150 Id.
139
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The court disavowed this possibility for several reasons. First, it asserted
that such price cuts are almost certainly precompetitive.151 Second, it found
that this suggestion was vague and might be construed to proscribe “limit
pricing,” a common practice that it seemed to doubt antitrust laws should
reach.152 Third, the court found it too difficult as a practical matter to
distinguish between price cuts with competitive purposes and those with
anticompetitive purposes.153 Finally, it deemed the business uncertainty and
costs to be too high under such a rule.154 And though it rejected the rule, it
concluded that the plaintiff would have failed to meet the Ninth Circuit’s test
because the discounts allowed Pacific to manage its excess capacity more
efficiently and therefore were cost saving, a fact that precluded a finding of
predatory intent.155
The Seventh Circuit followed suit in A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre
Farms, Inc.156 In Rose Acre, the plaintiffs, several egg producers, claimed that
the defendant, Rose Acre, engaged in predatory pricing by selling eggs to
supermarkets below costs.157 Rose Acre was a vertically integrated firm: it
managed all stages of production, from laying to grading, sorting, crating, and
shipping.158 Many integrated egg producers sold surplus eggs that would
otherwise go bad to “breakers,” or companies that would use the eggs for
baked goods or other products.159 Rose Acre, however, sold its surplus eggs to
supermarkets at reduced prices.160 Between 1978 and 1982, Rose Acre grew
significantly, accounting for about 1% of national production, 8.6% in a fivestate region, and 23.1% in Indiana.161 Its growth came at the expense of at least
some of its rivals, who brought suit.162
They alleged that Rose Acre sold at proportionally lower prices to
supermarkets located farther away, although transportation costs were higher,
and that its prices were below average total cost—and below average variable

151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

Id. at 234.
Id.
See id. at 234–35.
Id. at 235.
See id. at 236.
881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1398.
Id. at 1397.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1398.
See id. at 1397–98.

SHARPES GALLEYS4

2012]

REINTRODUCING INTENT INTO PREDATORY PRICING LAW

7/5/2012 2:12 PM

927

cost in one year.163 They claimed that Rose Acre’s discounts diminished after it
acquired the business of new supermarket chains.164 The plaintiffs supported
their claim with evidence of Rose Acre’s predatory intent. This included the
president’s statement to a rival—“We are going to run you out of the egg
business. Your days are numbered”—and the company’s treasurer indicating,
in response to a question about the company’s pricing, that its costs of
production had nothing to do with its prices.165 At trial, the jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiffs, but the judge granted Rose Acre’s motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because the verdict was not supported
by objective economic indicators.166
The Seventh Circuit affirmed,167 rejecting reliance on intent in the
process.168 The court began by observing the problem of separating aggressive
competition from predatory pricing and noting three ways courts make this
distinction: (1) scrutinizing the price–cost relationship, (2) focusing on the
defendant’s intent, and (3) examining the market conditions and the
corresponding feasibility of recoupment.169 The court favored using the third
approach and concluded that “intent plays no useful role in this kind of
litigation.”170 Specifically, it preferred focusing initially on the feasibility of
recoupment as a means of determining whether predation was possible,
without requiring a difficult examination of the defendant’s costs and prices.171
If predation is not feasible, the court need not inquire into the specifics of
prices and costs because the law should not be concerned with predation that is
unlikely to be successful.172 Even if a company intended to engage in predatory
pricing, “it [would be] bootless for the legal system to intervene” where such a
scheme would fail, because it would be unprofitable and, therefore, selfdeterring; even repeated unsuccessful attempts would be beneficial to
consumers.173

163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id. at 1398.
Id.
See id. at 1398–99.
Id. at 1397, 1399.
Id. at 1408.
See id. at 1400–04.
See id. at 1400–01.
Id. at 1401.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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The court further argued that “[i]ntent does not help to separate competition
from attempted monopolization and invites juries to penalize hard
competition.”174 The court took the evidence presented in the trial court as a
prime example. It explained that the statement of Rose Acre’s president was
completely consistent with hard competition and that the treasurer’s statement
really showed that Rose Acre was a “price taker,” rather than a monopolist.175
Nonetheless, these were the types of statements that lawyers and jurors were
likely to mistake for a smoking gun.176 The court argued that confusing
evidence of this nature also complicated litigation by increasing the parties’
focus on the discovery of this type of information.177 It concluded that
“[s]tripping intent away brings the real economic questions to the fore at the
same time as it streamlines antitrust litigation” and therefore held that intent
was not a basis for liability in a predatory pricing case.178 Because Rose Acre
sold in a nearly perfectly competitive market, in which it could not hope to
achieve and sustain a large-enough market share to recoup, the court affirmed
the district court’s judgment in favor of the company based on a finding that
recoupment was impossible.179
These cases from the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
represented the split that existed at the time of Brooke Group.
B. Intent After Brooke Group
The role of intent in predatory pricing law is somewhat unclear after
Brooke Group. On the one hand, the Court in Brooke Group did not explicitly
disavow any consideration of intent. On the other hand, elements of the
decision seemed to implicitly adopt the Barry Wright–Occam’s razor view that
intent simply has no role in predatory pricing analysis. The latter interpretation
of the decision seems to have weighed heavily on lower courts.
First, Brooke Group does not expressly reject any consideration of
intent.180 Some of the Court’s language even suggests that intent may still be
174

Id. at 1402.
Id.
176 Cf. id. (“[T]ake Lois Rust’s statement that Rose Acre’s prices were unrelated to its costs. Plaintiffs
treat this as a smoking gun. Far from it, such a statement reveals Rose Acre to be a price taker.”).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 See id. at 1403–04.
180 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 738a, at 168–69 (“Brooke holds that no matter what the defendant’s
anticompetitive intent, likelihood of recoupment must be established by objective evidence. . . . Clearly, intent
175
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highly relevant but is simply not at issue in its review of the case. Importantly,
the Court states, “[T]he essence of [a predatory pricing] claim . . . is . . . [that a]
business rival has priced its products in an unfair manner with an object to
eliminate or retard competition and thereby gain and exercise control over
prices in the relevant market.”181 The Court’s opinion therefore might be read
to regard intent as a crucial element of a predatory pricing claim. Such a view
seems to be supported by the Court’s holding:
Liggett has failed to demonstrate competitive injury as a matter of
law . . . because its proof is flawed in a critical respect . . . .
No inference of recoupment is sustainable on this record,
because no evidence suggests that Brown & Williamson—whatever
its intent in introducing black and whites may have been—was likely
to obtain the power to raise the prices for generic cigarettes above a
182
competitive level.

This holding undoubtedly preempts any test for predatory pricing that relies on
intent as the ultimate touchstone.183 However, these aspects of the opinion are
certainly consistent with the view that intent is still critical—or at least
relevant—to a predatory pricing inquiry and that it was simply not discussed in
the case because Brown & Williamson’s intent was not at issue in the appeal.
On the other hand, the Court’s opinion might be interpreted to preclude
consideration of intent. The Court’s holding itself stresses the importance of
objective market conditions and generally disregards the presence of an
improper intent. And elsewhere the Court’s discussion seems to disapprove of
reliance on intent.184 Also notable is the lack of weight the Court affords to

evidence cannot be used as a substitute for objective evidence of pricing below the relevant measure of cost.
Nevertheless, it might be relevant in other ways.”). In fact, the Court in Brooke Group cites neither Barry
Wright nor Rose Acre Farms but does cite Inglis, albeit on a general, ancillary matter. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S.
at 221 (citing William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981)).
181 Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
182 Id. at 231–32 (emphasis added).
183 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 738a, at 168–69.
184 See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 225 (“Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against
another does not, without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws.”). The Court was also dismissive
of its previous decision in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), which it noted “has
often been interpreted to permit liability for primarily-line price discrimination on a mere showing that the
defendant intended to harm competition or produced a declining price structure.” Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at
221. The Court stated that Utah Pie has been criticized extensively on that account but explained that it did
“not regard the Utah Pie case itself as having the full significance attributed to it by its detractors.” Id. Though
the Court did not overrule Utah Pie, it limited the holding from the case to a finding that the evidence was
sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff and dismissed the opinion as “an early judicial inquiry . . . [that]
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seemingly strong evidence of intent.185 Though some of the evidence of intent
presented at trial consisted merely of statements that Brown & Williamson
wanted to “speed up Liggett’s demise” and “put a lid on Liggett,”186 the bulk
of it consisted of detailed market analysis and plans produced by Brown &
Williamson’s senior officers.187 However, the strongest factor that supports this
interpretation is the Court’s enunciation of the “two prerequisites to recovery”
in predatory pricing claims—(1) below-cost pricing and (2) likelihood of
recoupment.188 Though ostensibly these are only prerequisites189—and not the
only requirements—the Court seems to treat them as dispositive.190 In fact, the
Court’s statement of these requirements immediately follows its statement that
“the essence of [a predatory pricing claim is that a] business rival has priced its
products in an unfair manner with an object to eliminate or retard competition
and thereby gain and exercise control over prices in the relevant market.”191
Though the Court does not cite the cases expressly eliminating consideration of
intent, its treatment of these requirements seems to implicitly adopt the
Occam’s razor view. And taken together, these factors suggest that intent is
irrelevant to predatory pricing claims. Lower courts certainly seem to think so;
they rarely mention intent and consistently speak of Brooke Group’s
prerequisites as the only two elements of a predatory pricing claim.192
did not purport to set forth explicit, general standards for establishing a violation of the Robinson–Patman
Act.” Id.
185 Compare Liggett Grp., Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 748 F. Supp. 344, 354 (M.D.N.C.
1990) (“The[] documents, indicating B & W’s anticompetitive intent, are more voluminous and detailed than
any other reported case. This evidence not only indicates B & W wanted to injure Liggett, it also details an
extensive plan to slow the growth of the generic cigarette segment.”), aff’d, 964 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.), aff’d sub
nom. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), and Glazer, supra note
92, at 610–13 (describing the strength of the intent evidence in Brooke Group), with Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at
231 (“Brown & Williamson’s entry into the generic segment could be regarded as precompetitive in intent as
well as effect . . . .”), and Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Trumping the Areeda–Turner Test: The
Recoupment Standard in Brooke Group, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 559, 580 (1994) (suggesting the intent evidence in
Brooke Group was more notable for its volume than for its strength). Regardless of how the intent evidence in
Brooke Group has been characterized, and despite the Court’s ultimate holding, the Court found that there was
sufficient evidence of predatory intent to support a jury finding on the issue. 509 U.S. at 231.
186 Glazer, supra note 92, at 610.
187 Id. at 610–11.
188 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222–24.
189 Id. at 222.
190 See id. at 226–27 (“These prerequisites to recovery are not easy to establish, but they are not artificial
obstacles to recovery . . . . It would be ironic indeed if the standards for predatory pricing liability were so low
that antitrust suits themselves became a tool for keeping prices high.” (emphases added)).
191 Id. at 222.
192 Cascade Health Solutions v. Peacehealth, 515 F.3d 883, 898 (9th Cir. 2008); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. v. Cigarettes Cheaper!, 462 F.3d 690, 695–98 (7th Cir. 2006); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc.,
431 F.3d 917, 932 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1115 (10th Cir. 2003); Beech-
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Thus, the status of intent in predatory pricing cases is ambiguous. Brooke
Group did foreclose the type of intent-based predatory pricing standards used
in Inglis and McGahee, but it did not expressly disavow all consideration of
intent. However, it did suggest to lower courts that its two prerequisites were
the only two elements of a predatory pricing claim. Courts below have seized
upon that suggestion, effectively ending any consideration of a defendant’s
intent in predatory pricing cases. The next Part discusses why, in the future,
courts should decline to follow such an interpretation and should insist upon
intent as a third requirement for a predatory pricing claim.
IV. ADDING AN INTENT REQUIREMENT
While the Court’s opinion in Brooke Group effectively ended any
consideration of intent in predatory pricing cases, it did not mandate such a
result. This Part argues that it is a mistake for courts to read Brooke Group in
such a manner and that they should begin including predatory intent as a third
requirement. Courts have eliminated an intent requirement for two reasons.
First, they have had difficulty grasping what intent means in predatory pricing
cases.193 Second, the alternative standards considered pre-Brooke Group were
either intent based or discarded intent altogether.194 This Part explains that
neither explanation presents an obstacle to the inclusion of intent in predatory
pricing analysis. It first clarifies what intent should mean in predatory pricing
cases and addresses evidentiary issues. It then explains why intent is a key
component of any predatory pricing inquiry and that reintroducing an intent
requirement into the current legal framework would make the law more
coherent and would function as a limiting principle.

Nut Nutrition Corp. v. Gerber Prods. Co., 69 F. App’x 350, 352 (9th Cir. 2003); Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284
F.3d 1237, 1244 (11th Cir. 2002); Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 477 (5th Cir. 2000); Nat’l
Parcel Servs., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Logistics, Inc., 150 F.3d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 1998); Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl.
Richfield Co., 146 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 1998); Astra Media Grp., LLC v. Clear Channel Taxi Media,
LLC, 679 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 414 F. App’x 334 (2d Cir.
2011); Arnold Chevrolet LLC v. Tribune Co., 418 F. Supp. 2d 172, 182–83 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
193 See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983) (struggling with
whether intent means “intent to harm” or some other form of intent).
194 Compare McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1503–04 (11th Cir. 1988) (embracing
intent as the touchstone of a claim, with shifting presumptions based on the defendant’s costs), with A.A.
Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[I]ntent plays no useful
role in this kind of litigation.”).
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A. Meaning of Predatory Intent
Framing the issue of intent has been a source of difficulty in predatory
pricing law: there are various ways of doing so, and courts have not always
been clear in this regard. And the manner in which it is framed has major
consequences. For example, if framed as an intent to harm or destroy
competitors, penalizing such intent runs the risk of discouraging
competition;195 if framed as an intent to undertake the price cuts at issue, intent
is meaningless196—after all, companies do not accidentally lower their prices.
To avoid potential difficulties, one must therefore identify what precisely is
meant by a requirement of predatory intent before making the case for its
addition and elaborating on how it might be employed.
1. Basic Meaning
The meaning of intent flows naturally from the definition of predatory
pricing “as a price reduction that is profitable [i.e., rational] only because of
the added market power the predator gains from eliminating, disciplining, or
otherwise inhibiting the competitive conduct of a rival or potential rival.”197
Viewed from this lens, predatory intent means the intent to profit through a
price reduction only by producing exclusionary or disciplining effects. Thus,
predatory intent would be present where the theory of profitability behind a
company’s price reduction is that it would exclude other companies from the
market or cause them to acquiesce to the company’s later elevated prices.
Predatory intent would be absent where the company’s price reduction is
backed by any other rationale.
195 See Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d at 1402 (“[A] desire to extinguish one’s rivals is entirely consistent
with, often is the motive behind, competition.”); 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 805b, at 407–08
(“‘[S]pecific intent’ clearly cannot include: the mere intention to prevail over one’s rivals. To declare that
intention unlawful would defeat the antitrust goal of encouraging competition on the merits, which is heavily
motivated by such an intent.”); Edward H. Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary
Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV. 373, 395 (1974) (“Plainly . . . the
‘specific intent’ required in attempt cases is not simply a subjective intent to prevail in the market. Instead, it is
the intent to indulge in means that are in some sense untoward.”).
196 See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 805b, at 409 (“[I]f intent equals conduct, then the
separate intent requirement itself becomes superfluous and can be abandoned.”).
197 Bolton, et al., supra note 28, at 2242; accord Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 222 (1993) (describing predatory pricing as reducing prices with the object of eliminating or
inhibiting competition); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 723a, at 22 (“[P]redatory pricing involves an
immediate sacrifice of profits through unreasonably low prices. These low prices destroy rivals or intimidate
them from selling at a lower price than the defendant charges. Then follows a ‘recoupment’ period . . . . In
order for predatory pricing of this variety to be a rational strategy, recoupment gains, discounted to present
value, must exceed the immediate losses from the predatory campaign.” (footnote omitted)).
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Therefore, a predatory intent is essentially the absence of a business
justification.198 Courts have recognized business-justification defenses in some
situations, apparently realizing that pure cost-based rules sweep too broadly.199
However, they have failed to provide any clear guidelines.200 For instance,
courts have recognized promotional pricing as a possible business
justification,201 but beyond that it is unclear what defenses might be
available.202 Despite some general language in cases since Brooke Group
pertaining to business justifications,203 courts have not provided any additional
guidance. As a result, some commentators have suggested definite recognition
of a number of business justifications, such as defensive price-cutting,
promotional pricing, learning by doing, and network externalities.204 To the
extent that business-justification defenses are recognized as affirmative
defenses, the burden is generally on the defendant to establish them.205
Even if the number of recognized business justifications increases, it will
necessarily be on an ad hoc basis.206 Given the relative infrequency of
predatory pricing cases, it is unlikely that the law relating to business
justifications will develop in an expedient and predictable manner. Thus, if
more emphasis is placed on business-justification defenses, the law on what
198 See Bolton et al., supra note 28, at 2274 (“A business justification or efficiencies defense serves as a
means of eliminating cases where below-cost pricing by a firm with market power is likely to be welfareenhancing, rather than predatory. In these cases, the sacrifice of present profits through low pricing is justified
for reasons other than exclusion or disciplining of rivals.” (footnote omitted)). Cf. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 725 (1980) (“[E]vidence of a respondent’s purpose may reveal the extent to which there
are legitimate business justifications underpinning the respondent’s conduct.”).
199 See LING ET AL., supra note 7, at 71–76; Bolton et al., supra note 28, at 2274 (“The defense . . . serves
as a necessary shield against an overly inclusive legal rule.”).
200 LING ET AL., supra note 7, at 71.
201 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 746a, at 271–75; see also Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 742
F.2d 1184, 1194 (9th Cir. 1984) (price competition in Portland gas market); Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc. v.
Buffalo Evening News, Inc. 601 F.2d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1979) (free samples of Sunday papers).
202 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 748, at 301 (proposing recognition of a “meetingcompetition” defense in certain situations); Areeda & Turner, supra note 26, at 715 (arguing that meeting
competition should not be a defense where the alleged predator prices below marginal cost).
203 See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1062 (8th Cir. 2000) (“A Section 2
defendant’s proffered business justification is the most important factor in determining whether its challenged
conduct is not competition on the merits.”); Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 475 (5th Cir.
2000) (“To determine whether conduct is exclusionary, we look to the proffered business justification for the
act.”). These cases recite language pertaining to business justifications in their general discussion of section 2
claims but do not address the issue in their predatory pricing analyses.
204 See Bolton et al., supra note 28, at 2274–82.
205 Id. at 2274.
206 Cf. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶¶ 746, 748, at 271–79, 301–05 (describing uncertainty with
even the most basic business-justification defense and suggesting fairly narrow circumstances in which a
meeting-competition defense might apply).
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constitutes such a justification will not become settled anytime in the near
future. Recognizing intent as the converse of a business justification
simultaneously places the burden on the plaintiff to prove the absence of a
business justification and settles the question of what constitutes a business
justification.
2. Evidentiary Issues
Evidentiary issues with the proof of intent appear to have been a driving
force behind its elimination from predatory pricing analysis. A major objection
to utilizing intent in predatory pricing cases is that plaintiffs’ attempts to prove
intent complicate litigation by expanding the scope of discovery to produce
supposedly smoking-gun-type statements in which the defendant evinces a
desire to destroy his competitor and that these statements, once produced,
distract and mislead the jury, ultimately reducing the accuracy of decisions.207
While these concerns may be valid under a different conception of intent, they
are inapt for the inquiry this Comment proposes. It is quite right to express
concern over the potential for statements such as “Let’s pound them into the
sand”208 or “We are going to run you out of the egg business”209 to mislead the
jury. After all, the desire to prevail over one’s rivals is completely consistent
with hard competition—a principal goal of antitrust law210—and the
presentation of such statements may give the impression of improper motive
where the only motive is to outcompete one’s rivals.
But the concern with such evidence is the same that the law has with any
nonprobative evidence.211 Such statements are simply not probative of the
issue of intent as it is described in this Comment—that is, they are not
probative of a company’s theory of profitability underlying its price cuts.
Because they do not affect the likelihood of predatory intent, they may be

207 See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989); AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 738, at 168–71.
208 U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
209 Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d at 1402 (internal quotation mark omitted).
210 See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 805b, at 407–08.
211 Compare AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 738c, at 175 (“To encourage judges and juries to
wallow in unprobative data invites the twin mischiefs of (1) burdening litigation with thousands of documents
about the firm’s motives and calculations and (2) inviting quixotic results.” (emphasis added)), with RONALD
L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 195–96, 327
(6th ed. 2007) (explaining the doctrines of logical relevance and legal irrelevance).
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inadmissible for lack of relevance.212 And, to the extent that such statements
are relevant to the issue of intent, they may still properly be excluded under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.213 Courts, therefore, already have the tools to
prevent these types of statements from burdening litigation and manipulating
results. Intent should not present any special issue so long as courts adhere to
the proper notion of intent.
Judges would simply have to use their discretion, bearing in mind that a
simple desire to crush competitors by outcompeting them is not relevant to the
inquiry—the goal must be to exclude or coerce. For example, it would likely
be appropriate to consider private consultants’ reports of the type in Inglis,
provided that there is a causal link between suggested strategies and those
actually adopted.214 Evidence, such as that in McGahee, that a firm
investigated competitors’ financials prior to implementing its series of price
cuts215 may also be relevant. At the same time, statements, such as those in
McGahee, merely showing that a firm wanted to crush competitors216 would
not be relevant. A company’s statements and memoranda might in some
circumstances be pertinent to the intent inquiry, but they would have to go
beyond merely stating the goal of crushing the competition to stating the
company’s projections and expectations for how it will profit from business
decisions. Additionally, proof of intent could center around companies’
business and financial records.217 In the absence of foul play, this information
should always be easily available218 and should provide sufficient information
from which to glean the defendant’s business rationale for its prices. Reliance
on these documents is unlikely to complicate litigation beyond its present state

212 See FED. R. EVID. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.”); id. R. 402 (“Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”).
213 E.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cigarettes Cheaper!, 462 F.3d 690, 696, 698 (7th Cir. 2006)
(affirming the exclusion of memoranda in which the defendant discussed ways to “shut down” and “kill” the
plaintiff). Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides, “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” FED. R.
EVID. 403. Because of their tangential probative value and tendency to mislead the jury, statements such as
those in R.J. Reynolds seem to be of the variety that should routinely be excluded under Rule 403.
214 The court’s treatment of the evidence in Inglis, however, was likely appropriate. See William Inglis &
Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1038–39 (9th Cir. 1982).
215 See McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1988).
216 See id.
217 Cf. Herb, supra note 59, at 1605 (proposing a practical test for predatory pricing claims involving the
examination of companies’ internal records).
218 Id.
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and should focus the inquiry on relatively dry business data that is unlikely to
mislead or inflame juries.
Whatever the type of evidence relied upon, to satisfy the burden of
production, the plaintiff would have to present some evidence tending to show
that the defendant’s theory of profitability behind its price cuts was based on
the ability to exclude or coerce. It could satisfy this burden either by providing
direct evidence of such intent or by demonstrating the inconsistency of the
scheme with legitimate business justifications, such as promotional pricing,
learning by doing, or network effects. If satisfied, the defendant would have to
rebut with some evidence that its prices were motivated by business objectives
other than excluding or coercing. The issue would then be litigated in a
standard fashion; there would be no need for allocating the burden differently
based on the defendant’s price–cost relationship. Whatever type of evidence is
presented, so long as courts keep in mind the proper definition of intent, the
inquiry would be unlikely to complicate litigation further and should focus on
information that is unlikely to mislead or inflame juries.
B. Why Intent?
Pre-Brooke Group cases addressing the issue of intent provided some
arguments for considering intent in predatory pricing analysis. But because
those cases relied on a somewhat different conception of intent and utilized it
in a different manner than this Comment proposes, they did not fully address
the reasons for its inclusion. This section explains that intent is a critical
element in predatory pricing analysis both to properly implement the antitrust
statutes and to provide appropriate limitations upon the scope of predatory
pricing law.
1. Statutory Requirements
The primary statutes under which predatory pricing claims are brought219—
section 2 of the Sherman Act and the Robinson–Patman Act—support an intent
219 These are not the only statutes under which predatory pricing claims might arise. For example, claims
may also arise under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, e.g., E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 96
F.T.C. 653, 653, 655 (1980), or under state unfair competition laws, e.g., Parish Oil Co. v. Dillon Cos., 523
F.3d 1244, 1244–47 (10th Cir. 2008). It is also possible for a predatory pricing claim to be brought under
section 2 of the Sherman Act as a claim of completed monopolization through a scheme of predation; intent
would not be as relevant to a completed monopolization claim because the fact of completion would establish
its anticompetitive nature. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 431–32 (2d Cir.
1945), superseded by statute, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat.
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requirement. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal to “attempt to
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations.”220 “[T]o demonstrate attempted monopolization a
plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or
anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.”221 Because a violation
of section 2 requires a specific intent to monopolize, consideration of intent is
certainly necessary in predatory pricing analysis under the statute. The only
questions are what constitutes a specific intent and how to assess it.
The specific intent required by section 2 developed by analogy to the
criminal law of attempt.222 As Judge Hand described:
[C]onduct falling short of monopoly, is not illegal unless it is part of
a plan to monopolize, or to gain such other control of a market as is
equally forbidden. To make it so, the plaintiff must prove what in the
criminal law is known as a “specific intent”; an intent which goes
223
beyond the mere intent to do the act.

A major purpose of a specific-intent requirement, then, is to confine the reach
of the attempt offense to conduct that presents an actual threat of achieving its
prohibited goals.224 This analogy therefore supports the idea that specific intent
should focus on the business rationale, or subjective purpose, for the alleged
predatory prices.225 The purpose behind the disputed price cuts is crucial in
determining whether they threaten monopolization or are consistent with hard
competition. Only where there is predatory intent—or no business justification
for below-cost prices—is there a threat of monopolization.226 It is important to
emphasize that the intent required is the intent to monopolize.227 The idea
1246 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, 28, 30 U.S.C.); 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 4, ¶ 805a, at 406.
220 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
221 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) (emphasis added).
222 William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1027 (9th Cir. 1982); 3B
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 804, at 403.
223 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431–32.
224 See Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1027 (“[S]pecific intent [in section 2] is used to confine the reach of an attempt
claim to conduct threatening monopolization.”); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 805b, at 341 (“The
purpose of the criminal attempt offense is to save society from the dangers presented by persons who
demonstrated their evil proclivities but who fell short of their criminal goals through miscalculation or
fortuity.”).
225 See 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 805b, at 409–10.
226 See Bolton et al., supra note 28, at 2274–82 (grounding several proposed business justifications in
their lack of threat to competition).
227 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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behind business justifications is that there are some legitimate rationales for
below-cost prices that make them unlikely to be harmful to competition and
thus unlikely to lead to monopoly.228 In other words, when there is a business
justification—and thus no predatory intent—the price cutting is part of a plan
to compete, not to monopolize the plan of which the price cuts are a part is not
to monopolize, but to compete. This is a key distinction: the goal of the
Sherman Act—and of the antitrust laws generally—is to prevent monopoly
while encouraging free competition.229 To avoid obfuscating this distinction,
the specific intent required by the statute should be construed to mean the type
of intent this Comment proposes.
The problem is that courts, consciously or unconsciously, have bought into
the Barry Wright–Occam’s razor view that intent is inferable from objective
economic conditions, and so it is unnecessary to consider it separately.230 This
is apparent from the fact that they continue to recite the specific intent
requirement when speaking of section 2 generally, but when they begin
analyzing predatory pricing issues, they mention only Brooke Group’s two
prerequisites.231 Note how precisely the two Brooke Group prerequisites map
onto the two non-intent requirements of a section 2 claim: below-cost pricing
matches closely with “predatory or anticompetitive conduct,” and feasibility of
recoupment matches closely with “a dangerous probability of achieving
monopoly power.”232 The Brooke Group prerequisites simply do not capture
the specific intent element. If they did, there would be no need for any
consideration of a defendant’s business justifications. Rather than actually
capturing intent, the two-pronged approach simply presumes the requirement is
satisfied, sometimes allowing the defendant to show otherwise.233 This
elimination of intent contrasts with judicial interpretation of other statutes that

228

See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶¶ 746, 748, at 271–72, 274, 301–03.
See 1 id. ¶ 103a, at 42–49; E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY
AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 16 (5th ed. 2003).
230 See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983) (explaining that
intent is superfluous and potentially distracting).
231 E.g., John Doe 1 v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2009); Cascade Health Solutions v.
PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1113–15
(10th Cir. 2003); Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 474, 477 (5th Cir. 2000); Astra Media Grp.,
LLC v. Clear Channel Taxi Media, LLC, 679 F. Supp. 2d 413, 422–23 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, 414 F. App’x 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
232 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
233 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 738a, at 169–70, 170 n.7 (noting that lack of intent has
occasionally appeared relevant in courts’ holdings that below-cost pricing did not amount to an antitrust
violation).
229
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impose harsh penalties for engaging in proscribed conduct.234 Consistency with
the statute, and judicial determinations in other areas, should dictate requiring
intent as a separate element.
While the Robinson–Patman Act does not provide as strong a textual basis
for an intent element, it too should be construed to require intent. The
Robinson–Patman Act prohibits price discrimination “where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly.”235 As the Court in Brooke Group emphasized, “By its terms, the
Robinson–Patman Act condemns price discrimination only to the extent that it
threatens to injure competition.”236 Furthermore, it provides statutory defenses
for price discrimination based on differences in costs,237 changing market
conditions,238 and good-faith price matching.239 These explicit exceptions
cover a good number of potential business justifications and go well beyond
those definitively recognized in predatory pricing law.240 “Thus, ‘the
Robinson–Patman Act should be construed consistently with broader policies
of the antitrust laws’”241—that is, consistently with the Sherman Act and
consistently with the goal of preventing monopoly while encouraging hard

234 Cf. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 615–16 (1994) (interpreting the National Firearms Act to
require a mens rea element where the statute was silent); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)
(“We hold that mere omission from § 641 of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that
element from the crimes denounced.”). The Sherman Act, like the statutes at issue in Staples and Morissette,
does impose criminal penalties. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). While predatory pricing cases are not pursued as
criminal actions, cf. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 229, at 68 (noting that criminal prosecution will
only be pursued for “per se violations” or cases in which a defendant has willfully violated the law), potential
penalties are extremely harsh.
235 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
236 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993).
237 See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (“[N]othing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or
quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered . . . .”).
238 See id. (“[N]othing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time to time where in response
to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not
limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales
under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned.”).
239 See id. § 13(b) (“[N]othing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus
made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers
was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a
competitor.”).
240 Note that meeting competition is not even a clear-cut business justification in predatory pricing. See
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶¶ 746, 748, at 271–79, 301–05.
241 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 220 (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 80 n.13
(1979)).
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competition.242 To do so, it should be read to require an element of intent in
predatory pricing cases.243
2. Intent as a Limiting Principle
Typically, considerations of intent in predatory pricing law have been
thought to reduce the burden on plaintiffs244 and to produce more false
positives. But such impressions are largely of intent-based standards. This
should not be the case under this Comment’s conception of intent. Focusing on
intent as a business’s rationale for its prices—whether it intended to profit by
excluding or coercing rivals, or had some other purpose consistent with
competition—would not punish firms for striving to outcompete their rivals.
Furthermore, requiring intent as an additional element, rather than as a
substitute for more objective, cost-based tools, would not reduce the burden on
plaintiffs but would increase it.
Intent is an essential component of a complete definition of predatory
pricing. Definitions that do not mention, or at least allude to, intent tend to
identify the concept very generally and then seek to determine on an ad hoc
basis which prices should be deemed predatory and nonpredatory,
respectively.245 This reveals that price- and cost-based tests leave holes;246
242

See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
Note that the Act places the burden on the defendant to prove certain statutory defenses. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a)–(b). This might suggest that the burden of proving a nonpredatory intent would be on the defendant.
See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cigarettes Cheaper!, 462 F.3d 690, 698 (7th Cir. 2006). However, as this
Comment has explained, intent is a critical element of the definition of predatory pricing. As such, intent
should be part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, and not merely a defense. Similarly, the Act does not place
the burden on the defendant to establish the absence of the Brooke Group prerequisites, though neither is
inherent in the term “price discrimination.”
244 See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1399–1402 (7th Cir. 1989)
(suggesting that intent evidence resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff and will frequently lead to false
positives); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983) (suggesting that a
standard that focused on “intent to harm” would almost always seem to be satisfied); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 4, ¶ 738b, at 171–73 (suggesting that consideration of intent is more likely to result in a finding of
illegality); cf. Herb, supra note 59, at 1605 (proposing a “Practical Test” for predatory pricing, which
examines the business’s own calculations and data, intended to lessen the financial and evidentiary burdens on
plaintiffs).
245 Compare Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222 (referencing the “object” of a firm’s pricing strategy in its
definition of a predatory pricing claim under the Robinson–Patman Act), and Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d at
1399 (noting that “the gravamen” of a predatory pricing claim under either section 2 or the Robinson–Patman
Act “is that the aggressor sold goods for too little money, hoping to cripple or discipline rivals so that it might
sell its wares for a monopoly price later”), with Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 231–32 (attempting to identify the
situations in which predatory pricing exists without giving a clear definition of predatory pricing before
holding intent irrelevant), and AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 723a, at 22 (explaining that predatory
243
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specifically, they are only “negative indicator[s],” whereas intent is a “positive
indicator.”247 Focusing on below-cost pricing and the feasibility of recoupment
helps to identify situations in which there was no predatory pricing and
establishes situations in which predatory pricing may have occurred, but it
does not affirmatively establish the presence of a predatory scheme.
Proponents of cost-based rules seem to recognize this much but seem satisfied
that such rules are sufficiently tailored so that predation may be presumed if
they are satisfied.248 The incompleteness of the two Brooke Group
prerequisites presents a major problem of overinclusion. Business-justification
defenses limit this problem to some degree but provide an imperfect solution.
There are no clear standards for when they might apply,249 which places a great
burden on defendants: they must establish that a business justification should
be recognized and that their conduct conforms to that justification. As this
Comment has discussed, any rationale for a business’s below-cost prices, other
than to exclude or coerce rivals, renders them procompetitive. As a result, it
does not make much sense to recognize a narrow number of business
justifications and to place the burden on the defendant to establish them.
Putting the burden on the plaintiff to establish predatory intent better reinforces
the distinction between anticompetitive conduct and hard competition.
Requiring intent as an additional element not only would provide a proper
limit on the ultimate scope of the law but also may decrease the burdens of
litigation. Because intent would be a third element of a prima facie case, it
would provide an additional mechanism for defeating meritless claims; claims
could be defeated because the plaintiff failed to establish below-cost pricing,250
feasibility of recoupment,251 or predatory intent. At least in some situations,
this might decrease the burdens of litigating the Brooke Group prerequisites.
For example, defining the relevant market is often a difficult task and may
pricing exists under “certain conditions [where] low prices may have anticompetitive effects,” rather than
providing a clear definition of the practice).
246 See Williamson, supra note 12, at 284–85 (stating that cost-based rules involve purely static economic
analysis that “fail[s] to account for . . . intertemporal attributes of predatory pricing”); see also E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 727 (1980) (“It is simply unrealistic to divorce conduct from intent.”).
247 Beck, supra note 96, at 1269.
248 See Areeda & Turner, supra note 26, at 712.
249 For a discussion of the limited and sporadic availability of business justifications, see generally
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶¶ 746, 748, at 271–79, 301–05; and LING ET AL., supra note 7, at 71–
76.
250 E.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 146 F.3d 1088, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding for the
defendant because the plaintiff did not prove below-cost pricing).
251 E.g., Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 478 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding for the defendant
because the plaintiff did not satisfy the recoupment prong).
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determine whether the prices at issue are below or above cost.252 The relevantmarket issue may have added importance because of the lack of uniformity
among the circuits with respect to the appropriate measure of cost.253 An intent
requirement may decrease the importance of vehemently contesting this issue:
if intent cannot be established, this and other points are nonissues. Adding an
element of intent may therefore reduce the costs of litigation, which could
reduce the potential for strategic misuse of predatory pricing lawsuits.254
Requiring intent as an element of predatory pricing may therefore provide
important limits on the scope of the law and minimize current problems with
predatory pricing litigation.
CONCLUSION
As this Comment has discussed, the task of separating normal, competitive
low prices from anticompetitive, predatory low prices is often difficult, and the
dividing line that results is seemingly illusory. Nonetheless, making a clear
distinction is necessary. Given the persistence of predatory pricing doctrine
over time, and recent scholarship advocating its expansion, it is unlikely that
the difficulties of the doctrine will vanish.
This Comment has advocated a novel approach to limiting the scope of
predatory pricing law. While traditionally intent has been used to produce
more favorable outcomes for plaintiffs, this Comment has argued that intent
can be utilized to provide a major limitation on the scope of the law. Doing so
will actually increase the burden on plaintiffs in predatory pricing cases and
produce more favorable outcomes for defendants, all else equal. At the same
time, this proposal may be consistently employed alongside other
commentators’ proposals, which advocate broadening the scope of the law—to
the extent that they are consistent with Brooke Group. This is important
because if such proposals gain traction with the courts, intent may still be used
as a means of limiting those new, broad rules without the necessity of
overruling them. Thus, future development of the law may make intent an even
more important limiting principle than it presently is.
252 See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 933–35 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
Supreme Court [has] emphasized that a product market may have submarkets and the definition of a market or
submarket focuses on economic realities and industry practice.” (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 325 (1962))).
253 See generally LING ET AL., supra note 7, at 4–8 (discussing the relevant cost used in various circuits).
254 See Crane, supra note 12, at 26–27 (explaining that the expense involved in predatory pricing litigation
makes the initiation of lawsuits an effective means of controlling rivals’ pricing behavior).
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Finally, requiring intent as an additional element is consistent with current
law. As a result, courts should not have to alter any existing law to implement
this Comment’s proposal. They can simply add the requirement as soon as the
issue arises. Doing so may provide an immediate and effective limit on
predatory pricing claims.
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